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ABSTRACT 
A fail-silent node is a self-checking node that either functions correctly or stops 
functioning after an internal failure is detected. Such a node can be constructed from 
a number of conventional processors. In a software-implemented fail-silent node, the 
non-faulty processors of the node need to execute message order and comparison 
protocols to 'keep in step' and check each other respectively. In this paper the design 
and implementation of efficient protocols for a two processor fail-silent node are 
described in detail. The performance figures obtained indicate that in a wide class of 
applications requiring a high degree of fault-tolerance, software-implemented fail-
silent nodes constructed simply by utilising standard 'off-the-shelf' components are an 
attractive alternative to their hardware-implemented counterparts that do require 
special-purpose hardware components, such as fault-tolerant clocks, comparator and 
bus interface circuits. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Replicated processing on distinct processors whereby outputs from faulty 
processors can be prevented from appearing at the application level (by employing 
means such as comparing or voting the outputs produced by the processors), provides 
a practical means of constructing systems capable of tolerating Byzantine (also 
referred to as fail-uncontrolled) processor failures. Such an approach can be used for 
constructing a fail-controlled node composed of a number of conventional processors 
on which application level processes are replicated. A particular case of a fail-
controlled node is a !+1 processor fail-silent node that either works correctly, or 
stops functioning (becomes silent) soon after an internal failure is detected. This 
behaviour of a node is guaranteed so long as no more than ! processors in the node 
fail. A two processor fail-silent node (!=1) offers a practical and economical solution 
to the problem of constructing fail-controlled nodes, as such, in this paper we will 
concentrate on the design, implementation and performance evaluation of two-
processor nodes. In particular, we will describe practical designs of software 
implemented two-processor fail-silent nodes suitable for use in distributed systems 
that meet the abstraction of fail-silence in the following sense: a node produces either 
correct messages which can be verified as such by destination nodes, or it ceases to 
produce new correct messages, in which case destination nodes can detect any 
messages it may produce as unwanted. 
 The paper is structured as follows. We begin by reviewing related work in the area 
of reliable node design, contrasting it with our approach and summarising the main 
contributions of the paper. We then describe the basic principles that underpin our 
fail-silent nodes, and then present what we term a reference implementation of a fail-
silent node; this implementation makes use of a standard, synchronised clock based 
message order protocol. After describing how the performance of this protocol itself 
can be improved, we present two new, much faster order protocols, based on logical 
clock and leader-follower (master-slave) approaches. Following this, we describe the 
design of a comparison protocol that makes use of the master-slave approach for 
message comparison. We then present the results obtained from our experimental 
work on comparative performance evaluation of the various implementations of the 
fail-silent nodes; conclusions from our work are presented in the final section of the 
paper. 
2. RELATED WORK 
A fail-controlled node that uses replicated processing with comparison/voting must 
incorporate mechanisms to keep its replicas synchronised, so as to avoid the states of 
the replicas from diverging. Asynchronous events (e.g., interrupts, timeouts), 
processing of non-identical messages are some of the reasons that could lead to 
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replica state divergence. Synchronisation at the level of processor micro-instructions 
is logically the most straightforward way to achieve replica synchronism. In this 
approach, processors are driven by a common clock source which guarantees that 
they execute the same steps at each clock pulse (of course, the logic of the individual 
processors must be deterministic). Outputs are evaluated (compared/voted) by a -
possibly replicated- hardware component at appropriate times (e.g., at each bus 
access). Asynchronous events must be distributed to the processors of a node through 
special circuits which ensure that all the correct processors will perceive such an 
event at the same point of their instruction stream [12, 23]. Since every correct 
processor of a node executes the same instruction stream, all the programs that run on 
the non-redundant version can be made to run, without any changes, on the node. 
This is the major advantage gained by synchronising at the level of micro-
instructions. Such implementations of two processor fail-silent nodes have been in 
use widely; Stratus [27] and Sequoia [2] are two well-known examples. In these 
systems, a common (reliable) clock source is used for driving a pair of processors 
which execute in lock-step. Access to the bus is controlled by a (reliable) comparator 
circuit which only enables access to the bus if the signals generated by the two 
processors are the same. Another example of a fail-controlled node is presented in 
[6]; this design employs tight synchronisation of redundant processors and in 
addition, uses coding techniques for detecting/correcting memory bit corruptions.    
There are however a few problems with the micro-instruction level approach to 
synchronisation. First, as indicated before, individual processors must be built in such 
a way that they will have a deterministic behaviour at each clock pulse, so that they 
will produce identical outputs ("don't care" transitions, for instance, where a bit can 
be either one or zero, are not allowed in the design of the processors). Second, the 
introduction of special circuits such as reliable comparator/voter, reliable clock, 
asynchronous event handlers, and bus interfaces, increases the complexity of the 
design, which in the extreme can lead to a reduction in the overall reliability of a 
node. Third, every new microprocessor architecture requires a considerable re-design 
effort. Fourth, because of their tight synchronism, a transient fault is likely to affect 
the processors in an identical manner, thus making a node susceptible to common 
mode failures.   
Approaches that do not use processor replication but rely instead on various 
application specific forms of checking mechanisms (e.g., watchdog timers) for 
detecting the erroneous behaviour of a processor have therefore been considered [e.g., 
17]. The error detection coverage of one such node has been estimated to be better 
than 99% [11]. However, these approaches are application specific (rather than 
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general purpose) and do not completely eliminate the second and third problems 
referred to above.  
An alternative approach that seeks to reduce (or eliminate altogether) the hardware 
level complexity associated with the approaches discussed above is to maintain 
replica synchronism at a higher level, for instance at the process, or task level by 
making use of appropriate software implemented-protocols. Such software-
implemented nodes can offer several advantages over their hardware-implemented 
counterparts: (i) technology upgrades appear to be easy; since the principles behind 
the protocols do not change, the protocol software can be ported relatively easily to 
any type of processor (including the ones expected to be available in the future); (ii) 
we note that by employing different types of processors within a node, there is a 
possibility that a measure of tolerance against design faults in processors can be 
obtained, without recourse to any specialised hardware assistance; and (iii) since 
replicated computations do not execute in lock-step, a node is likely to be more 
robust against transient failures [11]. 
The task synchronisation approach was pioneered by the designers of the SIFT 
failure-masking node [28]. In SIFT, application processes are structured as a set of 
co-operative cyclic tasks. Each task performs a deterministic computation. The 
execution of a particular iteration of a task consists of inputting some data (possibly 
generated by previous iteration of other tasks), processing the data, and outputting 
some results. Fault-tolerance is achieved by voting on the input data. Thus, task 
replicas must be synchronised at the beginning of each iteration (start of a frame). To 
achieve this, SIFT maintains a global timebase, and uses a static, priority based 
scheduling, which schedules tasks at pre-defined time frames. The global timebase is 
implemented by keeping the clocks of all the correct processors synchronised by a 
software implementation of a Byzantine resilient clock synchronisation protocol. In 
normal operation, the system only allows interruptions from clocks, which are 
handled by all correct processors at the beginning of the same time frame. Because of 
its application dependent design, the SIFT architecture can only be applied to a 
restricted range of applications. This is also the case for the VOTRICS system [25] 
which follows the design principles of SIFT to provide fault-tolerance in a different, 
but still specific, class of applications (railway signalling systems). 
In our work, we have taken the SIFT approach further by investigating the design 
of a family of failure-masking and fail-silent nodes (called Voltan [21, 22, 24]) that 
are capable of supporting quite general purpose message passing programs. Voltan 
nodes are composed of 'off-the-shelf' processors connected via communication links. 
The processors of a node execute message agreement and ordering protocols to 
guarantee that correct replicas of application processes will receive and process input 
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messages in identical order. The output messages produced by process replicas are 
evaluated either by a comparator (a fail-silent node), or a voter (a failure-masking 
node) at each processor. 
There is however a concern over the performance of software-implemented nodes 
due to the overheads imposed by redundancy management protocols. Indeed, in terms 
of performance, hardware-implemented nodes will always out perform their software 
equivalents (a hardware-implemented node will be capable of working at nearly the 
same speed as its constituent processors). In SIFT for instance, redundancy 
management protocols can consume as much as 80% of the processor throughput 
[15]. Hybrid solutions have been proposed to circumvent this problem. MAFT [10], 
FTP-AP [13], and Delta-4 [16] are hybrid architectures that share the same basic 
design. These architectures are structured around a micro-instruction synchronised 
hard core, on top of which conventional processors are replicated. The micro-
instruction synchronised hard core is responsible for executing redundancy 
management functions (e.g., message voting). This certainly improves the 
performance; however, the hard core re-introduces the problems associated with the 
hardware-implemented nodes. 
In this paper we present the design and implementation of software-implemented 
two-processor fail-silent nodes that are both efficient (in terms of performance) and 
capable of executing general purpose message passing software. We have performed 
a careful analysis of the performance of our original implementation of Voltan nodes 
(the reference implementation) and have examined several ways of improving its 
performance. This has led to the design of two novel message order protocols which 
are considerably more efficient than the original protocol. A property of a fail-silent 
node that has been exploited in our design for obtaining efficiency is that it is 
required to just detect a failure rather than mask it. We present these protocols and the 
resulting performance of the nodes. The performance figures obtained lead us to 
believe that in a wide class of applications requiring a high degree of fault tolerance, 
software implemented fail-silent nodes constructed simply by utilising standard 'off-
the-shelf' components and employing one of the new order protocols (particularly the 
leader-follower protocol) do represent an attractive alternative to their hardware 
implemented counterparts. 
3. BASIC PRINCIPLES 
3.1. System Model and Assumptions  
We assume that a failed processor (and therefore the processes running on that 
processor) can exhibit Byzantine behaviour; but we do make the assumption that each 
non-faulty processor in a node is able to sign a message it sends by affixing the 
message with a message dependent unforgeable signature; a non-faulty processor is 
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also assumed to be able to authenticate any signed message it receives. Digital 
signature based techniques [18] provide a very comprehensive way of meeting this 
functionality. We assume that non-replicated distributed computations are composed 
of a number of processes that interact only via messages. As an example, the function 
of a typical 'server' process is to cycle by selecting an input message from any one of 
its input ports, process it and, if necessary, output one or more messages on its output 
ports. It is necessary to assume that the computation performed by a process on a 
selected message is deterministic. This is the well known state machine model (where 
a state machine is a process) for which the precise requirements for supporting 
replicated processing are known [20]. Basically, in the replicated version of a 
process, multiple input ports of the non-replicated process are merged into a single 
port and the replica selects the message at the head of its port queue for processing. 
So, if all the non-faulty replicas have identical initial states then identical output 
messages will be produced by them, provided the queues of all correct replicas can be 
guaranteed to contain identical messages in an identical order. Thus, replication of a 
process requires the following two conditions to be met: 
Agreement: all the non-faulty replicas of a process receive identical input 
messages; 
Order: all the non-faulty replicas process the messages in an identical order. 
Practical distributed programs often require some additional functionality such as 
using time-outs when waiting for messages. Time-outs and other asynchronous 
events, high priority messages, etc. are potential sources of non-determinism during 
input message selection, making such programs difficult to replicate. In previous 
papers [22, 26] we have described how our nodes can be enhanced to provide the 
necessary functionality for dealing with such cases. In this paper, we will assume the 
simple state machine model discussed above. 
We assume that each processor of a fail-silent node has network interfaces for 
inter-node communication over (possibly redundant) networks. In addition, the 
processors of a node are internally connected by communication links for intra-node 
communication needed for the execution of the redundancy management protocols 
(e.g., message ordering and comparison). We assume that the maximum intra-node 
communication delay over a link is known and bounded: if a non-faulty process sends 
a message over a non-faulty link to a non-faulty process of a neighbour processor 
then the message will be received within "#time units. For simplicity, we will assume 
that the lower bound on the actual transmission delay, "a, is zero: 0!"a!" (so "#also 
represents the maximum variation in message transmission delays over a link). Link 
failures will be categorised as processor failures: a link failure that prevents a 
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message sent from a processor to be received by its neighbour in the node will be 
considered as a failure of the sender processor. 
Fig. 1 shows an example of a distributed system with three two-processor fail-
silent nodes (P, S and Q), connected by a dual redundant network (C1, C2). On such 
an architecture, 'node level' processes can be replicated on distinct nodes for 
increased availability (a node level process itself is composed of two processes, one 
on each of the underlying processors, and behaves like a fail-silent process). In 
particular, such a system architecture can be used for building highly available 
services by constructing K-resilient node processes: a K+1 replicated node level 
process (K>0) can tolerate a maximum of K replica failures before a subsequent 
failure makes the services it is providing becoming unavailable. In a separate paper 
we have shown how protocols for group communication between node level 
processes, necessary for supporting such services, can be implemented to run on two 
processor fail-silent nodes [7]. 
p1 p2 P S s1 s2
Qq1 q2
C1
C2
Fig. 1: A distributed systems architecture employing fail-silent nodes 
3.2. Basic Software Architecture 
We now describe the basic software architecture of a two-processor fail-silent 
node. In addition to application level computational processes, each processor of a 
node executes five system processes described below: 
i) Sender Process: this process takes the messages produced by the computational 
processes of that processor, signs them and sends them via the link to the neighbour 
processor of the node for comparison. 
ii) Comparator Process: this process compares authentic messages sent by the 
neighbour processor with their counterparts produced locally. If a message 
comparison succeeds, the singly signed authentic message received from the 
neighbour is counter signed (by considering the first signature as a part of the 
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message) and this double signed message, termed a valid message, is handed over to 
the local Transmitter process for network delivery to destination nodes. A comparison 
that detects a disagreement indicates a failure. Similarly, an absence of a message for 
comparison (after a node specific time-out interval) also indicates a failure. Once a 
failure is detected, the comparator process stops, and so does the sender process. No 
new valid messages can be produced by the node. 
iii) Transmitter Process: this process is responsible for sending the double signed 
messages over the network to destination nodes. As each processor has a Transmitter 
process, a node with correct processors will produce two copies of its every output 
message. In our subsequent discussions on timing analysis of a node, a node output 
will refer the valid copy that is produced first. 
iv) Receiver Process: this process authenticates messages received from the 
network or from the link and discards any unauthentic or duplicate messages. 
Authenticated messages from the network (valid messages) are sent to the local Order 
process. Authenticated singly signed messages from the link are sent to the 
Comparator. 
v) Order Process: this process executes an order protocol with its counterpart in 
the other processor of the node in order to construct identical queues of valid 
messages for processing by the computational processes. Since such a protocol entails 
the Order process to relay valid messages to its counterpart, it is sufficient for a 
message to be received from the network by any one of the processors of a node for it 
to be ordered at both the processors (the only exception is the asymmetric order 
protocol without feedback, to be discussed later, which requires a message to be 
received by a nominated processor -the leader- for ordering). 
The architecture can be adapted for the more general case of !+1 processor fail-
silent node; such a node will produce valid messages with !+1 processor signatures. 
3.3. Node Failure Semantics 
We assume that application processes of correctly functioning nodes assign 
monotonically increasing sequence numbers to new messages they produce; this 
property enables correctly functioning destination nodes to discard replicas of any 
previously received messages. Let an application process running on a correctly 
functioning unreplicated node take t units of time to compute the response to an input 
message. The corresponding correct output from a fail-silent node will take at most 
t'=t+tdelay units of time, where tdelay, tdelay>0, is the bounded worst-case delay 
introduced by the redundancy management protocols. If the output from the fail-silent 
node is produced later than t' then the node will be said to have suffered a 
performance failure [4]. A fail-silent node can be in one of the three states (see fig. 2). 
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Normal Silent
Failing
 
Fig. 2: Fail-silent node states 
(i) Normal State: In this state, a node produces correct outputs. Detection of an 
internal failure (by the comparator process) causes the node to irreversibly enter 
either the failing state or the silent state. 
(ii) Failing State: This is an intermediate state in which the node can suffer at 
most one performance failure. From this state the node eventually enters the terminal 
silent state. 
(iii) Silent State: No new valid messages are produced by the node. Any messages 
produced by the node can only be invalid or copies of previously produced valid 
messages: any functioning destination node can detect these messages as unwanted. 
The reason for the existence of the intermediate failing state is as follows. A faulty 
processor can contain a message from the correct processor sent for comparison (a 
message that was sent before the correct processor stopped). The faulty processor can 
output this as a valid double signed message at any future time. The Sender and 
Comparator processes of each processor must therefore incorporate intra-node 
message synchronisation measures to ensure that each processor of a node at any time 
has no more than one message which has been sent to the neighbour for comparison 
but has not yet been compared locally; in this way, the number of performance 
failures in the failing state can be limited to at most one. 
The fact that a fail-silent node can suffer a single performance failure in the 
intermediate state need not be a cause for concern in most applications. Consider a 
system of "fail-crash" nodes without an intermediate state. A client application with 
timing constraints and expecting a response from such a node would still be expected 
to contain timeliness checks for detecting an absent response. The same checks will 
be adequate for the case of fail-silent nodes for filtering out late responses. If 
application programs have no timing constraints, then a performance failure suffered 
by a fail-silent node in the failing state will not cause any inconsistencies. 
Thus, a system of software implemented fail-silent nodes can be regarded as 
capable of implementing the abstraction of fail-silence in the following sense: a node 
produces either correct messages which can be verified as such by destination fail-
 - 10 - 
silent nodes, or it ceases to produce new correct messages, in which case destination 
nodes can detect any messages it may produce as unwanted. 
It is possible to design specialised fault-tolerant network interfaces that could 
prevent further messages from being output by a node once one of the processors 
detects a failure. Minimally, we need to provide a network interface with a single 
switch that can unilaterally and irreversibly be switched off by a control signal sent 
by either of the processors in the node. 
Any software solution to the design of a node that has no intermediate failing state 
will require additional redundancy. For example, one could delegate the 
responsibility of message comparison and output to a separate node that does not fail. 
A 2!+1 failure-masking node (capable of masking up to ! processor failures within a 
node) could provide the services of message comparison and output to a collection of 
!+1 processor nodes. Indeed the failure-masking node can provide other services, 
such as recording the status of fail-silent nodes. This design very much resembles that 
of a system of fail-stop nodes [19] that can switch from the functioning to the halted 
state, and can provide failure-status indication. 
3.4. Rationale behind the Experimental Work 
In the rest of the paper we will be describing our experimental work on evaluating 
a number of designs for two-processor fail-silent nodes. However, before that, a brief 
discussion on the rationale behind our experimental work is worth a mention. We 
note that the performance of a fail-silent node will depend on how quickly messages 
can be ordered and compared. Ordering can be achieved in several ways. The basic 
idea is to have an agreement protocol which guarantees that all correct replicas 
receive the same set of messages and then accomplish ordering by assigning 
monotonically increasing sequence numbers to messages. It is also necessary to 
devise a method to establish when a message becomes stable, i.e. when it is 
guaranteed that no valid messages with sequence numbers less than a certain value, 
seq, will ever be received, so that all messages with sequence numbers less than seq 
can be processed in a consistent order among all the replicas. General methods for 
assigning sequence numbers to messages, and associated stability tests for different 
system assumptions have been discussed in [20]. We have used these ideas and 
applied them to the special case of two-processor fail-silent nodes. The delay 
imposed by the comparison protocol will mostly be made up of the time spent in 
message exchanges plus any delay introduced by the intra-node message 
synchronisation measure necessary to ensure that each processor of a node at any 
time contains no more than one message from the neighbour for comparison. 
We took the following approach in our quest for a design that minimised both 
ordering and comparison delays. First we performed a reference implementation 
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based on a design that was relatively easy to understand. For this reason, in the 
reference implementation we used a simple order protocol for messages and a simple 
comparison protocol that did not incorporate any synchronisation measure for 
limiting the number of received messages from the neighbour to just one (potentially, 
such a node can suffer more than one performance failure in the failing state). We 
then investigated a number of ways of reducing message ordering delays. After this 
we investigated message comparison protocols with synchronisation measures. Our 
work on order protocols proved highly significant in coming up with a clean and 
efficient solution. Having selected a design for the comparison protocol, we 
undertook comparative performance evaluation of four node designs, all using this 
comparison protocol but with different order protocols for input messages, starting 
with the one used in the reference implementation. We had carefully designed the 
software of the reference implementation in a modular fashion; this made it relatively 
easy for us to replace or modify modules to incorporate the necessary changes [24]. 
4. REFERENCE IMPLEMENTATION 
 4.1. Software Architecture 
The overall software architecture of a fail-silent node is depicted in fig. 3, where 
the major software modules within a processor of a node and their interactions are 
summarised. A processor maintains several message queues and lists: 
a) Received Message Queue (RMQ): Contains valid messages intended for 
ordering, received from the network. 
b) Delivered Message Queuei (DMQi): Contains ordered messages to be 
consumed by the application process Servicei. 
c) Processed Message Queue (PMQ): Contains unsigned output messages 
produced by local application processes. These messages must be 
validated by the Comparator process before transmission to the final 
destination. So, the Sender process is responsible for transmitting 
messages in PMQ to the neighbour processor, as well as to the local 
Comparator process. 
d) External Candidate Message List (ECL): Contains singly signed messages 
that have been received from the neighbour processor for validation. 
e) Internal Candidate Message List (ICL): Contains unsigned messages, each 
waiting for a matching signed message to arrive in ECL. 
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f) Compared Message Queue (CMQ): Contains successfully compared and 
double signed messages (valid messages) ready to be transmitted over the 
network. 
Order
Comparator
Receiver
Sender
Transmiter
PMQ
ICLRMQ
CMQ
ECL
DMQi
From the Network
From the Link
To the Network
To the Link
From?
Network Link
Servicei
Fig. 3: Software architecture of a processor in a node 
4.2. Comparison protocol 
The reference implementation uses a very a simple comparison protocol: referring 
to fig. 3, the Sender process of a processor transmits messages from the PMQ to the 
neighbour, where they get buffered in the neighbour's message pool ECL. The 
Comparator process maintains, for each application process Servicei, the sequence 
number of the next message to compare (recall that application processes assign 
monotonically increasing sequence numbers to new messages they produce). Using 
this criterion, the Comparator matches messages with identical sequence numbers 
from ECL and ICL; a comparison that detects a disagreement indicates a failure. 
Similarly, an absence of a message for comparison (after a node specific time-out 
interval) also indicates a failure. Once a failure is detected, the comparator process 
stops, and so does the sender process. 
In this simple protocol, the ECL of a processor is permitted to contain more than 
one correct message from the neighbour; thus potentially, a faulty processor can 
output more than one late valid message. In a latter section we will describe the 
additional synchronisation measure necessary to prevent this from happening. 
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4.3. Order Protocol with Synchronised Clocks 
Our reference implementation of the order protocol, to be described in this section, 
makes use of the well-known approach of using synchronised clocks for message 
ordering. The clocks of both processors in the node are assumed to be synchronised 
such that the magnitude of the measurable difference between readings of clocks at 
any instant is bounded by a known constant, say $. Because the non-faulty processor 
stops as soon as a failure is detected, the clock synchronisation protocol need not be 
fault-tolerant, and can be assumed to execute in a fault-free environment. It has been 
shown that the lower bound on $ is "/2 [5]; so in a fault-free environment, $ can be 
taken as "/2 provided the inter-synchronisation period is kept small enough so that 
the effects due to differences in the running rates of clocks can be ignored. The Order 
process of a processor timestamps a message to be ordered with its local clock 
reading. A copy of the timestamped message is sent over the link to the Order process 
of the other processor in the node. If T is the timestamp of the message received from, 
or sent to the Order process of the other processor, then the message becomes stable 
at local clock time T+", where "="+$. Once a message with timestamp T becomes 
stable, no valid messages with timestamp T'<T can be received by an Order process. 
Stable messages are enqueued in the appropriate DMQi in increasing timestamp order 
(with the action being taken to discard, rather than to enqueue a stable message, if its 
replica has already been enqueued). 
The Order process is composed of three cyclic processes: Relayer, Transfer and 
Deliver (see fig. 4). The Relayer process picks up messages from the RMQ, 
timestamps them and sends them to the other processor in the node. It also inserts the 
message into the Ordered Message List (OML). The Transfer process receives 
relayed messages from the link, and performs a timeliness check that rejects any 
message received too early (messages with timestamp less than C-$, where C is the 
current reading of the processor's clock) or received too late (messages with 
timestamp greater than C+"). Accepted messages are inserted into the OML. The 
Deliver process takes stable messages (messages with timestamp less than C-") from 
the OML, removes duplicates and enqueues the messages on the appropriate DMQis 
in increasing order of timestamps. 
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Deliver
Relayer
Transfer
RMQ
To the Link
OML
DMQi
From 
the 
Link
Order
Fig. 4: Order protocol with synchronised clocks 
To compare the ordering speeds of various protocols in failure-free situations, we 
will define the actual stability delay (#a) for an order protocol in terms of a reliable 
reference clock. (Such a clock could be a correct processor's physical clock.) When 
both the processors of a node are correct, #a of an order protocol for a given message 
from the network is defined as the reference clock time that elapsed between the 
instant a copy of the message is first received by one of the processors of the node 
and the instant that message gets ordered and enqueued in the appropriate DMQis of 
both the processors in the node. Throughout this paper, we will assume that the 
effects of differences in the runnning rates between the reference clock and any 
correct processor's clock are negligible when intervals such as $, " and %#are 
measured. With this assumption, #a of the order protocol just presented will be: 
#a = " + min{&$a, 'a}; 
where 'a ('a$0) is the magnitude of the message reception skew according to the 
reference clock, i.e. the difference between the reference clock times when each 
processor in the node receives a copy of the message from the network, $a (0!$a!$) is 
the magnitude of the actual clock synchronisation error at the time the message is first 
received from the network, and &#is the ahead factor which is 1 if the clock of the 
processor that first received the message from the network is ahead of the other 
processor's clock, or zero if either the first processor's clock is not ahead or 'a=0. 
Note that if only one processor receives the message from the network and the other 
does not, then 'a=(, but the message will be ordered at both the processors. 
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We will also define #min and #max to be respectively the lower, and the upper 
bound of the actual stability delay of an order protocol (#min!#a!#max). Therefore, 
for the above protocol we have: 
#min="; #max="+$; and "!#a!"+$. 
The fixed overhead of at least " units of time implicit in this order protocol has 
motivated us to seek enhancements. We begin by describing a method for improving 
the above protocol and then describe new protocols that do not require the clocks of a 
node to be kept synchronised. 
5. IMPROVED ORDER PROTOCOLS 
5.1. Improving the Synchronised Clock Algorithm 
The arrival of a relayed message can be used to reduce the constant stability delay 
% imposed by the order protocol. We shall assume that messages sent over the link 
are received in the sent order. Given this fifo assumption, the timestamp of a received 
relayed message can be used to define a new lower bound on the actual stability 
delay. Fig. 5 will be used to illustrate the idea. 
In case (a) a relayed message with timestamp T is received and the local clock 
reading, C, is greater than T. As no more messages will be received for ordering from 
the neighbour bearing a timestamp smaller than or equal to T, and any new local 
message for ordering will get a timestamp greater than or equal to C, all messages 
from that sender for ordering (in OML, fig. 4) with timestamps smaller than or equal 
to T are stable. 
Case (b) shows the case where a message with timestamp T is received for 
ordering from the neighbour and C<T. In this case all messages for ordering with 
timestamp smaller than C are stable. Note that in this case it is guaranteed that the 
neighbour's clock is ahead of the processor's clock, and also that the message could 
not have taken more than "/2 time in transmission across the link. (Otherwise, it is not 
possible to have C<T with $ being "/2.) Therefore, updating the local clock to T+1 
will not cause the magnitude of the clock difference to increase beyond "/2, i.e., 
beyond $.) With this update, a relayed message with timestamp T received by a 
processor will define a new stabilisation interval such that all the messages with 
timestamp smaller than or equal to T are stable (case (c)). In other words, any 
message relayed from one processor to the other becomes stable at the receiving 
processor as soon as it is received,  
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(a)
Local Clock Time
T
CC -%
(b)
(c)
Stable timestamps in accordance with synchronised clock protocol
Stable timestamps assuming FIFO channels
Non-stable timestamps
C -%
C -%
T
T
C
C
Local Clock Time
Local Clock Time
Fig. 5: Stability intervals 
To derive #a for the modified protocol, let the processor that is first to receive a 
message from the network receive it at reference clock time Tr. The other processor 
will receive the relayed message at time Tr+"a (where "a, 0!"a!") is the actual link 
transmission delay) and can immediately order it. The first processor will be able to 
order the message at time Tr+% or at time Tr+'a+"a if it receives the relayed message 
from the other processor before Tr+%. So, we have: 
 #a=min{%, 'a+"a}*#and, #min=0; #max=%; and 0!#a!%. 
5.2. Order Protocol with Logical Clocks 
We can take the idea discussed before a step further and eliminate the requirement 
of having the physical clocks of the processors forming a node to be kept 
synchronised, and instead use logical clocks for generating timestamps [14]. 
In this order protocol each processor of a node maintains two logical clocks 
(counters), namely the local logical clock (LLC) and the remote logical clock (RLC), 
which are initialised to 1, and 0 respectively. LLC is used to timestamp messages 
relayed to the neighbour for ordering, while RLC is used to store an "estimation" of 
the neighbour’s LLC. These clocks are updated in the following way: whenever a 
processor relays a message to its neighbour, it timestamps the message with the 
current value of LLC , and increments LLC by one; whenever a message with 
timestamp T is received from the neighbour, RLC is set to T and LLC is set to the 
maximum of its current value and T+1. These updates ensure the following 
properties: 
 (i) messages are relayed to the neighbour bearing increasing timestamps; and 
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 (ii) the value of RLC of a processor is smaller than that of the LLC as well as 
that of its neighbour’s LLC. 
Property (ii) guarantees that all messages for ordering with timestamps smaller 
than or equal to RLC are stable. So, as before, a relayed message becomes stable at 
the receiver processor as soon as it is received, and the actual stability delay will be: 
#a='a+"a. 
The protocol as presented above has one shortcoming. Messages at a processor can 
become stable only after the arrival of a relayed message from the neighbour (because 
RLC is updated only when a message relayed from the neighbour is received). 
However, a processor can only relay a message if it receives it from the network, so if 
only one of the processors receives a message from the network ('a=(), it will be 
prevented from stabilising that message. To solve this problem we discuss a scheme 
based on time-outs that allows a processor to update RLC even if the other processor 
does not relay a message [20]. 
When a processor (say P1) relays a message (say m1) with timestamp T to its 
neighbour (say P2), it schedules an update of RLC to value T to occur at time t+2", 
where t is the value read on its physical local clock when m1 was relayed. At time 
t+2", RLC is updated to T only if its value is less than T. The 2" time-out interval 
follows from the fact that after receiving m1 with timestamp T, LLC of P2 will have 
the value of at least T+1; therefore any message with timestamp smaller than or equal 
to T relayed from P2 to P1 (say m2) will have been relayed before P2 received m1. In 
the worst case, this would be done just before the reception of m1, with m1 and m2 
each taking " units of time. Thus P1 must wait for at least 2" units of time before 
advancing its RLC. 
The Order process of this protocol is also composed of the three cyclic processes 
which work in a fashion similar to those discussed in the previous protocol (see fig. 
4). The Relayer process picks up a message on its RMQ, timestamps it with the value 
T read on LLC, and places the message on its OML. Then, a copy of the timestamped 
message is sent over the link to the neighbour processor. Finally, the processor's LLC 
is incremented by one, and an update of RLC to T is scheduled to be executed in 2" 
units of time. The Transfer process receives a relayed message with timestamp T from 
the link, performs a timeliness check (a message is considered timely if its timestamp 
is greater than the current value of RLC), and if timely, places it in the processor's 
OML. LLC and RLC are then updated if necessary as discussed before. Messages in 
OML with timestamps less than or equal to RLC are stable. Thus we deduce: 
 #a=min{2", 'a+"a}; #min=0; #max=2"; and 0!#a!2". 
5.3. Asymmetric Order Protocol 
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 We now present a protocol where we assign different roles to each of the two 
processors forming a node. We will term one processor the leader and its neighbour 
the follower. It is the responsibility of the leader to determine the order of processing 
messages. Having selected a message for processing, the leader sends a copy of the 
message to the follower (the inspiration for this way of building a fail-silent node 
comes from the leader-follower replication protocol for application level processes 
used in the Delta-4 system [1, 16]). Due to the simplicity of this ordering mechanism, 
there is no need for a special Order process within a processor. Instead we will have 
Receiver processes with different functionality in the leader and in the follower. 
The node works as follows (see fig. 6); the leader maintains a counter whose value 
is used for assigning unique identifiers to input messages. An authentic double signed 
message received by the Receiver of the leader is tagged with the counter's value, and 
the counter is incremented by one. The message is then deposited in the appropriate 
DMQi in increasing order of tag values and a copy of the message is also sent to the 
follower across the link. Output messages from an application process, Servicei, 
follow the same path as discussed before. Tagged messages from the leader reach the 
follower where they also get deposited in the appropriate DMQis. Message buffers 
ECL, ICL, CMQ and the comparator process have the same role as before. 
DMQ
i
Comparator
Receiver
Sender
Transmiter
Servicei
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DMQ
i
From the 
Network
From the Link
To the 
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Fig. 6: Leader-follower fail-silent node 
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The asymmetry introduced by assigning different roles to the two processors of a 
node requires us to introduce an extra mechanism in the follower for detecting late or 
non arrival of a message for ordering from the leader. A Timing process (see fig. 6) is 
introduced in the follower. The follower's Receiver process deposits each authentic 
double signed input message received from the network in the External Received 
Message List (ERML) with an associated time-out +. Copies of messages received 
from the leader via the link and on their way to DMQi, are deposited in the Internal 
Received Message List (IRML). The Timing process picks up each message in the 
IRML and resets the time-out associated with its counterpart (if any) in the ERML. If 
a time-out expires, the follower assumes that the leader has failed to send a message 
for ordering, and stops the activities of all the processes in its processor. 
Unlike the previous protocols, in order to calculate the actual stability delay of this 
protocol it is relevant to identify the processor that first receives a copy of a particular 
input message. We will define 'LF as the difference between the time that the leader 
receives a copy of a particular input message, and the time that the follower receives 
a copy of the same message. The actual stability delay for this protocol is then given 
by: 
 #a=#F=#L+"a, and #L= ,
-
.0, if 'LF<0
'LF, otherwise;
  
where #L and #F are the actual stability delay for leader and follower, respectively. 
The above protocol can be embellished to deal with the case where a correctly 
functioning leader does not receive a message from the network, but the follower 
does, which leads to the node becoming silent. The follower processor can try to 
prevent a shut down by feeding the leader with the missing input message. In this 
'feedback' version of the leader-follower protocol, after a time-out + has expired, the 
follower sends a copy of the missing input message to the leader in order to have it 
properly ordered (for simplicity, this path is not shown in fig. 6). A second time-out 
+', +'$2", is associated with the message. If this time-out also expires, then the 
follower may assume that the leader has failed, and the follower will cease its own 
activities. The stability delays become: 
#a=#F=#L+"a, and #L= ,
-
.0, if 'LF<0
min{'LF, ++"a}, otherwise.
  
Also, 
 #min=0, #max=+++', and 0!#a!+++'. 
A sensible strategy is for the follower to set +=0 (thus, as soon as the follower 
receives a message from the network, it checks for the presence of the corresponding 
relayed message from the leader) and +'= 2", thus #max for this protocol becomes 
identical to the logical clock protocol. 
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6. ASYMMETRIC COMPARISON PROTOCOL 
 The comparator protocol discussed before permitted a node in the failing state to 
commit more than one performance failure. One way of preventing this from 
happening is to use a comparison protocol that guarantees that a processor sends a 
given message for comparison to its neighbour only after all previously sent messages 
have been successfully compared locally. In order to prevent deadlocks, it is also 
necessary that the processors first agree on the order in which they have to exchange 
messages for comparison. In our architecture, a logical way of achieving this 
agreement would be to insert an order process between the PMQ and the Sender 
process of each processor. The asymmetric ordering approach discussed in the 
previous section provides a very convenient way of integrating ordering with 
comparison. Accordingly, we present a comparison protocol based around the leader-
follower technique. It is worth noting that our comparison protocol can be used 
within a node that uses any order protocol for input messages (synchronised clock, 
logical clock or the leader-follower); this is because ordering for input messages is 
independent from ordering for output messages. The description to be given here 
concentrates on the message synchronisation aspects of the protocol, the other aspects 
remain unchanged. 
For the purpose of message comparison then, one processor is assigned the role of 
a leader, and the other, the follower. In the leader, the messages in the PMQ follow 
the same path as before (see fig. 3). However, the following synchronisation between 
the Sender and the Comparator is introduced: the Sender is allowed to send a new 
message over the link for comparison only if permitted by the Comparator, and this 
permission is granted by the Comparator after it has finished comparing the current 
message. 
 
 - 21 - 
Comparator
Sender
PMQ
ICL
CMQ
ECL
To the 
Link
Transmiter
To the Network
Service i
Fig. 7: Message comparison 
On the follower's side, messages produced by application processes follow a 
slightly different path, as shown in fig. 7. The Comparator compares the message in 
the ECL (sent by the leader) with the locally produced one in the ICL; if the 
comparison succeeds, the valid message is deposited in the CMQ for network 
delivery and the locally produced message is deposited in the PMQ for delivery over 
the link to the leader. This message will arrive in the ECL of the leader, get compared 
and, if successful, the Comparator process of the leader will then permit the local 
Sender process to send the next message for comparison. 
7. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
In this section we present the performance figures obtained after a set of 
experiments we have run. Our main objective has been to assess the degradation in 
performance suffered by a node as it is called upon to execute the redundancy 
management software not present in an ordinary processor. Currently, simple 
checksums are being used as signatures and so have a minimal impact upon system 
performance. The need for more complex signature mechanisms has not yet been 
assessed. 
We have implemented fail-silent nodes on T800 Inmos transputers and evaluated 
their performance under four protocols for ordering input messages: (i) the reference 
implementation based on clock synchronisation algorithm; (ii) logical clocks; (iii) 
leader-follower; and (iv) leader-follower with feedback. All these implementations 
made use of the asymmetric message comparison protocol discussed before (for the 
cases (iii) and (iv), the processor acting as the leader for ordering was also the leader 
for comparison). The two processors of a node are directly connected to each other by 
transputer links, thereby providing a fast internal path for intra-node communication. 
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The first experiment consists of a client application process executing on a node, 
and requesting a simple service from a server application process which executes on a 
different node. The client process issues a request to the server process and waits for 
the response. The server process receives a request from the client, services it (the 
actual computation performed is minimal) and sends the response back to the client. 
Upon reception of the response message the client issues a new request. We have 
measured the following time intervals for the server process: 
(i) Input delay (ID): The Input delay measures the time interval between a message 
entering the node (the earliest of the reception times at the processors) and the 
message being last removed from DMQi by one of the processors. The delay is made 
up of the actual stability delay for a message (#a) plus the time taken up by 
authentication and queue manipulation within the node; it reflects the overhead 
involved in ordering messages at a node. 
(ii) Output delay (OD): The Output delay measures the time interval between a 
message becoming ready for comparison at both the processors (i.e. largest of the two 
times the message is entered in the PMQ) and the message being output by the node 
(i.e. being first output by one of the processors). It reflects the time taken for a 
message to be compared, and output. 
(iii) Node delay (ND): Finally, the Node delay is simply the sum of the input and 
output delays (ID+OD). It reflects the earliest response from a node to a given input 
message, i.e. the overhead associated with replication. 
We have collected data for ten runs of experiments; each run involves the client 
node sending 100 request messages of 64 bytes. For each one of the time intervals 
discussed above we have averaged the values measured for each of the requests 
processed. We have also measured the average link transmission delay ("av), and the 
average message reception skew ('av). The average delays obtained are summarised 
in Table I, where the figures are expressed in milliseconds. 
 
Model/Delays(ms) ID OD ND "av 'av 
Synchronised Clocks 20.21 4.09 24.30 3.47 1.44 
Logical Clocks  7.64 3.18 10.82 3.94 1.50 
Leader-Follower 4.34 2.06 6.40 2.32 1.23 
Leader-Follower (feedback) 4.79 2.48 7.27 3.07 0.89 
Table I. Performance figures for a client-server system 
(i) Unreplicated Node: We have also executed the experiment using single 
processor nodes. As we would anticipate, for the case of ordinary processors, the 
overheads are small; they exist because it is still necessary to enqueue and dequeue 
messages in the system. The measured node delay for the server amounted to about 
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1ms, of which about 0.7ms was due to input overheads, whilst about 0.3ms was due 
to output overheads. 
(ii) Nodes with synchronised clock order protocol: Experiments under worst 
case circumstances determined the smallest safe value for " to be 12ms. This 
reference implementation of a node uses a simplified version of the clock 
synchronisation algorithm presented in [9]. As stated before, $ can be set to "/2, 
hence we fixed $=6ms which gives the stability delay, ", of 18ms (since "="+$/. 
Measurements indicated that the actual stability delay is almost the same as ", so the 
values shown in Table I for ID indicate that the overheads due to message 
authentication and queue manipulation take up to 2.21ms. 
(iii) Nodes with logical clock order protocol: Using logical clocks, the actual 
stability delay would be around "av+'av. Assuming the overheads due to message 
authentication and queue manipulation to be same as above, the results given in Table 
I show that this expectation of #a is almost realised in practice. Unlike the previous 
protocol, this and the asymmetric protocols have their performance proportional to 
the actual values of transmission delays and message reception skews.  
(iv) Nodes with leader-follower order protocols: For the asymmetric order 
protocols, it is necessary to examine separately the performance of leader and 
follower processors since they are executing different protocols. From the analysis 
presented in the previous section, ID corresponds to the follower’s stability delay 
(#a=#F=#L+"a), plus any overhead due to message authentication and queue 
manipulation. In our experiment, the two nodes were directly connected by leader-to-
leader and follower-to-follower transputer links. Therefore, because the follower 
always outputs messages before the leader, most of the time it will also be the 
follower who will receive a copy of a particular input message first. Thus, most of the 
time we will have 'LF>0, and consequently #a='LF+"a. The values shown in Table I 
indicate that the message handling overheads for the asymmetric protocols (0.79ms 
for the leader-follower, and 0.83ms for the leader-follower with feedback) are close 
to those experienced by the unreplicated node. This is because the functions of the 
order protocol are incorporated into the Receiver process (the overheads are slightly 
bigger because in the replicated node messages must be authenticated). From the 
performance figures presented for the two leader-follower protocols, we see that the 
extra message traffic introduced by the feedback mechanism has hardly any impact 
on the performance of the node. 
Despite the fact that all the implementations make use of the same comparison 
protocol, figures in Table I show that a node with an asymmetric order protocol for 
input messages suffers less output delay than the node with the symmetric one. The 
reason for this is that the asymmetry introduced for input ordering and for comparison 
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helps the follower at comparison time: by the time a message becomes available in 
the ICL (see fig. 7), the leader's message will usually be available the ECL.  
Our next experiment was performed to evaluate the impact of the size of input 
messages (messages that need to be ordered) on the performance of a node. The size 
of messages will affect intra-node message transmission times, consequently 
affecting both input and output delays. Transputers use a byte-stream protocol for 
link-level communication. On our system, the end-to-end message transmission delay 
between two transputers varied from 1.8ms (messages of size 256 bytes) to 3.3ms 
(messages of size 2048 bytes). Using the same client-server system, we measured the 
node delay for the various order protocols as the message size was increased from 
256 to 2048 bytes (see fig. 8). 
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Fig. 8: Impact of message size 
The impact of message size on order protocols will not be uniform. The increased 
transmission delay will have little impact on the performance of the order protocol 
based on synchronised clocks, because its stability delay is based on the worst case 
transmission delay0#Thus the node delay for the synchronised clock protocol suffers a 
moderately small increase of 1.24ms (from 24.76ms to 26.00ms), mainly due to the 
increased output delay. On the other hand, as we would expect, other protocols would 
be affected more strongly: the values in fig. 8 show an increase of 3.57ms for the 
logical clock protocol and increases of 4.17ms, and 3.16ms for the leader-follower, 
and the leader-follower with feedback protocols, respectively. 
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In our last experiment we measured the maximum throughput: the maximum rate a 
node with a given order protocol can order and compare messages. We have 
compared the throughput of each node configuration with the throughput of the 
unreplicated node. For this experiment we have used a fixed message size of 64 bytes 
and a modified version of the client process. The client process now does not wait for 
the response to arrive before issuing the next request; rather it sends a continuous 
stream of request messages. The experiment simulates the environment where a 
server process always has input messages for processing. We have measured the rate 
(messages per second) at which messages were deposited in the CMQ by the 
comparator of the processor that first output a message (see fig. 3). This output rate 
(OR) was then used to obtain the throughput ratio TR: (OR/ORunreplicated) where 
ORunreplicated is the output rate measured for the unreplicated node. The figures 
obtained are presented in table II. 
 
Model OR (msg/sec) TR (%) 
Unreplicated node 329 100.00 
Synchronised Clocks 66 20.06 
Logical Clocks  68 20.67 
Leader-Follower 130 39.51 
Leader-Follower 
(feedback) 
111 33.74 
Table II: Throughput of a heavily loaded node 
Under a heavy load, the ordering protocols will have their performance closer to 
the worst case. We see that the performance of the node with logical clock protocol is 
almost the same as the synchronised clock based node. The asymmetric protocols still 
out-perform the other protocols. 
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We have described our work on building efficient fail-silent nodes. We first 
performed a reference implementation that made use of a simple comparison and 
order protocols. We have then investigated how the performance of the order protocol 
can be improved; this led to a much simpler protocol based purely on logical clocks, 
obviating any need for keeping intra-node clocks explicitly synchronised. We have 
also designed and implemented asymmetric order protocols. We then described how 
the asymmetric ordering approach can also be exploited for the construction of an 
efficient message comparison protocol. Extensive experiments were performed to 
evaluate the performance of nodes under these order protocols. The results obtained 
indicate that adopting the asymmetric leader-follower mechanism within a fail-silent 
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node for message comparison as well as for ordering represents the best design 
choice. It must be stated here that it is possible to design a symmetric comparison 
protocol that does not require processors to decide order for exchanging messages for 
comparison. In such a protocol, the Sender and Comparator processes of a processor 
ensure that at any given time there is no more than one message that has been sent for 
comparison before being locally compared first. Combining this protocol with other 
symmetric ordering protocols discussed earlier could result in other efficient node 
designs. 
Our performance figures have been obtained after quite a careful engineering of 
the message passing software. It is unlikely therefore that significantly better 
performance can be obtained through improved message passing mechanisms, so the 
leader-follower node described here probably indicates the limits of what can be 
achieved using standard 'off-the-shelf' processors and asymmetric protocols. In our 
particular implementation, the performance impact of using fail-silent nodes is to 
produce a delay in response of about 6ms per message in a lightly loaded system. 
Secondly, under worst case loading, a fail-silent node can achieve about 39% 
throughput rate of its non-replicated counterpart. It should be appreciated that this 
price in performance becomes significant in only those distributed applications where 
processes interact frequently. If on the other hand, application processes are involved 
in computations requiring little interactions then the performance impact of adding 
software-implemented fail-silence can be quite small. Thus, bearing in mind the 
discussion presented at the start of the paper on the advantages of software-
implemented fail-silent nodes over hardware-implemented nodes, we can anticipate a 
range of applications for which these software-implemented nodes offer an attractive 
alternative to their hardware-implemented counterparts. We conclude by highlighting 
some of our recent work that further illustrates the advantages of the software-
implemented approach. 
The software approach makes it possible to apply the fail-silence measures 
selectively, only to those processes that are deemed critical in a given application. 
The Voltan system software that uses the asymmetric leader-follower mechanism is 
sufficiently lean to make it practical to use it as a software library for constructing 
self-checking process-pairs. Each member of a process-pair contains a number of 
threads that together implement the entire Voltan message ordering and self-checking 
mechanisms. We have implemented the system software that permits a collection of 
distributed processes to be replicated transparently giving an equivalent collection of 
self-checking Voltan processes  [3]. 
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The software approach also makes it possible to extend the capabilities of a node 
with relative ease. We have proposed a simple, but significant embellishment to the 
capabilty of a fail-silent node; the resulting node has been termed a fail-stable node 
[8]. In addition to the fail-silence property, a !+1 processor fail-stable node has the 
second property of providing a stable store: the node maintains a log whose contents 
survive any internal failure. The log is accessible to other nodes in the system, and 
can be used for constructing the most recent states of processes running on the node 
before the node stopped. The state information provided by a halted node facilitates 
easy and prompt restarting of the stopped processes on other nodes. Such a node 
therfore forms an attractive building block for constructing available distributed 
systems.  
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